Scientific discovery is the process of devising a new hypothesis or theory that explains observable phenomena. The concept has been the subject of much philosophical reflection, resulting in many different interpretations of the nature of scientific discovery and, at times, intense disagreement about whether a philosophy of discovery is possible.
Until the 20th century, most philosophers of science had a conception of discovery that was narrower than Whewell’s. For example, they disagreed about whether the act of having a happy thought, or the eureka moment, should be regarded as part of the process of discovering, and about the extent to which a theory-induced discovery can be predicted from observations and experiments. Moreover, some philosophers held that the process of developing a theory – or “colligation” as Whewell put it – is not a part of discovery and that there are no rules (or, at least, that the notion of a rule cannot be articulated) by which this process is guided.
In the late 20th century, scholars began to rethink their ideas about discovery. Some argued that there is more to discovery than the eureka moment, and that the other parts of the process of discovery can be analysed in terms of reasoning processes. These arguments often drew on resources from empirical research in actual human cognition, including studies of problem-solving procedures, AI, and cognitive science. They also drew on knowledge from other fields of scientific inquiry, such as sociology and history of science.
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